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I. INTRODUCTION
When a marriage is dissolved, and an absolute divorce is granted,
all rights and duties based upon that marriage end-except for ali-
mony.' This single marital obligation continues beyond divorce when
1. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 620 (1988). In its technical sense, "alimony" means nourishment or suste-
nance, and has for its sole object the provision of food, clothing, shelter, and other
necessaries for the wife. See Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1956); Bredin v. Bredin,
89 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1956); Floyd v. Floyd, 108 So. 896 (Fla. 1926); see also 25 FLA.
JUR. 2D Family Law § 433 (1981).
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all other obligations have ceased.'
Historically, England and America have differed in their ap-
proaches to alimony and divorce. In England, the ecclesiastical courts
only granted divorces a mensa et thoro, partial divorces, which author-
ized spouses to live apart, but did not free them from the marriage
bond.' The alimony awarded by these courts merely constituted recog-
nition and enforcement of the husband's duty to support the wife which
continued after judicial separation." In contrast, American petitions for
absolute divorces are usually granted.3 Even though the United States
still follows the English model for alimony, requiring one spouse to fi-
nancially aid the other, changes in statutory and constitutional law,
the influence of the women's rights movement, and the changes in the
economic position of women have been reflected in new rules governing
the support obligations of spouses. 7 To facilitate the determination of
2. CLARK, supra note 1, at 642.
3. Id. at 619; see also 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPA-
RATION § 857 (1891) (no court in England had jurisdiction to dissolve marriages until
1858).
4. CLARK, supra note 1, at 619; see also Killian v. Lawson, 387 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1980) (a husband has a common law duty to support his wife); Floyd v. Floyd, 108 So.
896, 898 (Fla. 1926) ("Alimony is based on the common-law obligation of the husband
to support the wife."); Davies v. Davies, 113 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(money required to be paid by a man to his former wife for her sustenance derives
from the legal duty to support his wife which he assumed when they married); 25 FLA.
JUR. 2D Family Law § 433 (1981).
5. CLARK, supra note 1, at 620. However, the purpose for awarding alimony in
an absolute divorce is less clear because a divorce acts to free two people from the
marital bond. Id. In many instances, the final decree for a dissolution of marriage
marks the beginning of one spouse's obligation to pay alimony to the other spouse. Id.
6. Id. at 619.
7. See Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (the
horse and buggy days are over and women now have a place in the business commu-
nity.); Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (Barkdull, C.J.,
dissenting), review denied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973). In 1975, 48.3% of married
women in the 25-34 age group participated in the labor force. THE STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 384 (1990). In 1988, that figure was 68.6%. Id. The
corresponding figures for women who were either widowed, divorced or married (spouse
absent) were 67.5% in 1975 and 76.3% in 1988. Id.
In fact, in Florida, the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971 expressly provided
that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony to
either party, . . . [and] [i]n determining a proper award, . . . [tihe court may consider
any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." FLA. STAT. § 61.08
(1971). In contrast, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act states:
The court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds
[Vol. 16
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who shall receive alimony and to what extent it should be awarded,
alimony is divided into the following categories: 1) temporary alimony, 8
2) rehabilitative alimony,9 and 3) permanent alimony. 10 However, only
discussions which concern permanent alimony are the subject of this
comment.
While many wives still do not work, those who do most often do
not earn as much as their husbands." Therefore, as a practical matter,
most support litigation is brought by the wife against her husband.'"
For convenience in terminology, the following discussion refers to the
husband's duty of support. Of course, the principles outlined apply
equally to the less frequent suit by a husband.' 3
Doubts about how much alimony should be given' 4 or about how
that the spouse seeking maintenance: (1) lacks sufficient property to pro-
vide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to
seek employment outside the home.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(a) (1987).
8. Temporary alimony is an allowance made to a spouse for maintenance during
the pendency of an action. See, e.g., Floyd, 108 So. at 898; see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D
Divorce and Separation § 521 (1983).
9. "Rehabilitative alimony is a form of alimony designed to place the dependent
spouse in an income generating position, which would [eventually] free the obligor
spouse from [alimony] obligation[s] .... " 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §
521 (1983); see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) ("The
principle purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to establish the capacity for self-support
of the receiving spouse .... ").
10. Permanent alimony is an allowance for the support and maintenance of a
spouse during his or her lifetime. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 328-29 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 624 (1983) (perma-
nent alimony is used primarily for the purpose of distinguishing that allowance from
temporary alimony allowed during the pendency of a suit).
11. CLARK, supra note 1, at 253; see THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 455 (1990) which states that the mean earnings of married husbands
in the 25-34 year age group in 1987 was $25,238; however, the corresponding figure for
married women in that age group was $13,077. Id.
12. CLARK, supra note 1, at 253.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Ray v. Ray, 247 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (the
amount of permanent alimony to be awarded in a divorce proceeding lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court); see also 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 469 (1981)
(collected cases); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Amount of
Money Awarded as Permanent Alimony Following Divorce, 28 A.L.R.4TH 786 (1984).
19911
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long the payments should continue after divorce15 have been the subject
of much litigation. A complex issue is raised when, after divorce, the
obligor spouse's fortunes greatly improve. 6 The question here is
whether the receiving spouse should get an increase in alimony based
on this fact alone. Some cases answer this question in the affirmative. 7
However, this article advocates that those cases were wrongly decided.
A receiving spouse should not be awarded an upward modification in
her alimony simply because the obligor spouse has benefitted from in-
creased financial wealth since the parties' divorce. Once the marital
bond is broken and the relationship between the parties end, the receiv-
ing spouse does not have a right to claim an amount which would
maintain her above that lifestyle which she was accustomed to during
the marriage. 8
In contrast to the author's viewpoint on whether alimony should be
increased based solely on the obligor spouse's increased ability to pay,
is the recently decided Florida Supreme Court case, Bedell v. Bedell.'9
In Bedell, the parties were divorced after thirteen years of marriage.20
At the time of the dissolution, Mr. Bedell had opened his first medical
office. Then, eleven years after the divorce, Mrs. Bedell filed a petition
in the trial court seeking an upward modification of her alimony based
solely on the fact that her former husband had an increased ability to
pay.
15. See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 366 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (former husband's petition seeking modification of divorce decree and terminat-
ing periodic alimony upon showing that former wife had become self sufficient); see
also Comment, Divorce-Alimony-Death of Divorced Husband Terminates his Obli-
gation to Pay Alimony, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1074, 1075 (1954) (as a general rule, ali-
mony terminates on the husband's death unless there is a provision in the settlement
agreement or in the decree that expressly states otherwise).
16. CLARK, supra note 1, at 662.
17. See, e.g., England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review denied, 381 So.
2d 767 (Fla. 1980).
18. An exception to this would be a situation in which the wife financially sup-
ported the husband while he attended school for specialized training during their mar-
riage, and the parties divorced before the obligor spouse reached his financial potential.
In this situation, the wife should be entitled to share in the husband's success, because
her efforts contributed to that success which he now enjoys. See Moss v. Moss, 264
N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982);
Dewitt v. Dewitt, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
19. 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
20. Id. at .1006.
[Vol. 16
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Thus, Bedell addressed the issue of whether an upward modifica-
tion of alimony should be granted when based solely upon an increase
in the payor's ability to pay without the recipient spouse proving in-
creased or continuing need that was not initially satisfied by the origi-
nal divorce decree.2 1 The Florida Supreme Court held that a significant
increase in the financial ability of the obligor spouse to pay may, stand-
ing alone, justify an order of increased alimony. 2
The purpose of this comment is to critique the Florida Supreme
Court's holding in Bedell. Emphasis is placed on Florida statutory and
case law; however, other jurisdictions are referenced in order to oppose
Florida's position. To this end, the comment is divided into five sec-
tions. The first section discusses permanent alimony because an under-
standing of permanent alimony is necessary for the discussion of Bedell
which follows. 23 The second section discusses the bases upon which ali-
mony modification may be sought.24 The third section presents a chro-
nology of prior Florida cases which lead to the conflict resolved by the
Florida Supreme Court in Bedell. The fourth section of this comment
is a critical analysis of the Florida Supreme Court's rationale as ap-
plied in Bedell. The final section concludes and discusses whether Be-
dell has established a uniform standard which the lower courts must
follow when presented with an alimony modification issue, or whether
the court sidestepped the issue and failed to resolve the conflict.
II. ALIMONY
When a marriage ends, one spouse may be required to financially
support the other spouse via permanent alimony. 5 This obligation owed
by a husband to his former wife was initially regarded by the courts as
a personal duty owed to society.2" An award of permanent alimony 2 by
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1007.
23. The Bedell controversy arose out of a permanent alimony award which was
granted to Mrs. Bedell at the time of the divorce.
24. For an in depth discussion of what constitutes "changed circumstances" for
purposes of alimony modification, see Carol Gilliam Green, Note, Domestic Relations:
Modification of Future Alimony Payments Due to Changed Circumstances, 20 WASH-
BURN L.J. 66 (1980); 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §§ 699-745 (1983).
25. For definition of permanent alimony, see supra note 10.
26. Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960). But
see, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
("The necessity of insuring that the divorced wife could not become a public
1991]
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the trial court does not become a vested interest to receive alimony 28
and it is always subject to the jurisdiction of the court for modifica-
tion. 9 Because the recipient of permanent alimony does not have an
inherent vested right to receive alimony, the question of whether per-
manent alimony shall be awarded at all, and if so, what the proper
amount of the award shall be, rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court.8 0
Many Florida courts have stated that a divorced wife is entitled to
live in a manner reasonably commensurate with the standard of living
established during the course of the marriage.8 1 Because many women
sacrifice their own careers so that their husbands may maintain theirs,
and tend to the needs of the family and the family home, this author
agrees that a divorced wife should be maintained in the lifestyle which
she enjoyed while the parties were married. However, the amount of
alimony allowed should not be such that one spouse passes from misfor-
charge-is a thing of the past.") (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906, 908-
09 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., dissenting)). Prior to 1971, section 61.08 only awarded
alimony to the wife: "In every judgment of divorce in an action by the wife, the court
shall make such orders about . . . alimony . . . to be made to her, and . . . the secur-
ity to be given therefor, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case is equitable." FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969). However, The Dissolution of Marriage
Act of 1971 changed so that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the trial
judge may grant alimony to either party . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1971).
27. Permanent alimony is permanent only in the respect that it is a final provi-
sion for maintenance, contained either in a separate maintenance order or in the final
judgment for dissolution of marriage. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 624
(1983).
28. O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see
also Hunt v. Hunt, 394 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (a wife does not have
a vested right in her husband's earnings forever).
29. See, e.g., Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954) (modification
should be based on a clear showing of changed circumstances and the financial ability
of the husband); Ludacer v. Ludacer, 211 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
("The amount of alimony ... is, in every case, a matter of continuing jurisdiction.").
30. Accord Cyphers v. Cyphers, 373 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Shultz v. Shultz, 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ray v. Ray, 247 So. 2d
473 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); McGarry v. McGarry, 247 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1971): see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) ("Judi-
cial discretion is defined as [t]he power exercised by courts to determine questions to
which no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circum-
stances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court."); see also
Patrick v. Patrick, 399 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (amount of monthly
alimony award is within discretion of trial court).
31. E.g., O'Neal, 410 So. 2d at 1371.
[Vol. 16
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tune to prosperity, and the other spouse passes from prosperity to mis-
fortune.8 2 "As a general [rule], the amount awarded as permanent ali-
mony must be fair and just under all circumstances of the case." 3 In
situations where both parties maintained careers during the marriage
and neither party was exclusively dependent on the income of the other,
alimony should be denied."'
However, in determining those cases in which it would be fair and
just for one spouse to receive permanent alimony, two factors must be
present.3 First, it is necessary that one spouse demonstrate a need for
the funds.3 6 Second, the other spouse must have the financial ability to
supply the needed funds. 7 Of the two factors listed above, the receiving
spouse's need is the most significant because regardless of whether the
other spouse has the financial wealth to pay a reasonable amount of
alimony, the needy spouse is clearly not entitled to receive it unless her
resources are not enough to maintain her in the same lifestyle that she
was accustomed to during the marriage.3 8 For example, in Anderson v.
32. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204.
33. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 653 (1983); see FLA. STAT. §
61.08(2) (1989) ("The court may consider any factor necessary to do equity and jus-
tice between the parties.").
34. For example, in Campbell v. Campbell, the evidence showed that the former
wife was able to support herself adequately and to a degree comparable with the stan-
dard of living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. 432 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 453 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1984).
35. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2)(d) ("In determining a proper award of alimony,
the court shall consider . . .[t]he financial resources of each party."); 25 FLA. JUR. 2D
Family Law § 454 (1981).
36. 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 454 (1981); see O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d
1369 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (permanent alimony is used to provide the former
wife with the necessities of life as was established by the marriage between the par-
ties); Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (permanent
alimony award to wife was proper where she had been a housewife during the parties
twenty year marriage and did not work outside the home); Cyphers v. Cyphers, 373 So.
2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (amount of alimony award was not excessive
where wife was not in a position to support herself without assistance from her former
spouse); McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (ali-
mony is predicated on the needs of the wife).
37. Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954) (in determining ability to
pay, the court must consider the nature of the obligor spouse's capital assets as well as
his income); O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (the
obligor spouse must be able to meet the needs of the recipient spouse); McAllister v.
McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (alimony is predicated on
the husband's ability to pay it); 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 454 (1981).
38. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 647-48.
1991]
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Anderson, the court stated:
In determining the question of what alimony, if any, should be
awarded to the wife in a divorce proceeding, [the wife's] monetary
need must first be met by her own resources-her wage, earning
capacity, and her separate estate-and only then, if they are not
adequate, may the husband be called upon to provide her with such
additional funds as from the circumstances of the parties .... so
Florida Statute section 61.08 further provides that in addition to
the financial circumstances and needs of the parties, the trial court may
take into consideration any factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties, including such factors as the length of time the
parties have been married, the standard of living established during the
marriage, age, health and the conduct of the parties.40 Because every
39. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
40. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1)(2) (1989) which provides:
(1) The court may consider the adultery of a spouse . . . in determining
.. . the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony .... the court shall con-
sider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage . ...
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
See also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980) (award of alimony
was proper given the income of the parties, the length of the marriage, the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties, and the education of the wife); Ira Mark Ellman, Note,
The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1989). However, The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act which primarily considers the factors only of the proposed recipient
spouse:
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts . . . [as] the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct, and . . . considering relevant
factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance . ..
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
8
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case revolves around a unique set of facts, the consideration of these
additional factors help assure that justice between the parties will be
attained in each case.
III. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
Subsequent to a final judgment for dissolution of marriage which
includes an alimony award, either party may petition for modification
based upon a change in circumstance."' "Changed circumstances may
warrant modification of future payments on the theory that alimony is
a substitute for support, and support [which is] subject to modification,
alimony should [also] be [modifiable].' 2 The authority to modify per-
manent alimony awards based upon the requisite showing of changed
circumstances is usually within the sound discretion of the trial court.' 3
Likewise, in Florida, changed circumstances, may, as a matter of law,
warrant a modification of the amount of existing alimony payments,
either upward or downward, according to the particular facts of each
case." Even though it is not expressly stated in section 61.14, there is a
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b) (1987).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989). The term "change of circumstance" is
defined as a condition used to show a need for modification of a support order. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Note, supra note 24, at 69.
43. The authority to grant permanent alimony awards is given to the trial court
by statute in many states. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-122 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-86 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989) ("The court has jurisdic-
tion to make orders as equity requires .... "); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp.
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101 (Supp.
1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.32 (Supp. 1986); see also CLARK, supra note 1, at 655.
But see Pope v. Pope, 342 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("A
petition to modify an award of alimony . . . may not be denied when the change is
clearly shown.") (quoting Chord v. Chord, 209 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968)).
44. Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); see,
e.g., Schlesinger v. Emmons, 566 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (where
former wife's need was not originally met, great improvement in former husband's in-
come due to inheritance warranted an upward modification); Waskin v. Waskin, 484
So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (reduction of former husband's financial
condition resulting from voluntary act did not warrant a downward modification of his
1991]
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general agreement among the courts that to warrant modification, the
changed circumstances must be substantial"5 and permanent."' Courts
will not ordinarily modify an alimony decree based on a mere expecta-
tion that circumstances will change in the future.'
Many courts have struggled with the concept of what constitutes a
substantial change so as to warrant a modification of the alimony de-
cree. Since each case is unique, a court's decision on whether to modify
an alimony award lies within the particular facts of each case. Some of
the more common grounds for modification in Florida include changes
in the recipient spouse's needs; reduction of the obligor spouse's in-
come; and an increase in the obligor spouse's income without a corre-
sponding increase in the need of the recipient spouse.
A. Changes in the Recipient Spouse's Needs
If the needs of the recipient spouse have increased since the di-
vorce, her alimony may be increased provided that the obligor spouse
has the present financial ability to meet those increased needs."' The
alimony obligations).
45. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (Once
awarded, permanent alimony is subject to modification upon a substantial change of
circumstances.); Bloemendaal v. Bloemendaal, 275 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Cheves v. Cheves, 269 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Note, supra
note 24, at 69; J. Matthew Carey, Note, Reduction in Alimony as a Result of Changes
in Financial Condition: A Guide for the Practitioner, 15 J. FAM. L. 300, 306 (1977)
("The determination of substantiality . . . must be made by evaluating the collective
impact of the alleged change on both parties . . . .") (emphasis in original). The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act provides for modification "only upon a showing of
changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscion-
able." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 316(a) (1987). Furthermore, the
spouse petitioning for modification of the alimony decree has the burden of showing a
"substantial change in the material circumstances since the decree was entered." 24
AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 711 (1983).
46. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 463 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, 461 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bish v.
Bish, 404 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Note, supra note 45, at 307.
47. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 712 (1983); see Penland v. Pen-
land, 442 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (alimony may not be modified for
anticipated changes in circumstances).
48. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957); see Pope v. Pope, 342
So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960); M. L. Cross, Annotation, Change in Financial Condition or
Needs of Husband or Wife as Ground for Modification of Decree for Alimony or
[Vol. 16
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increased need may be due to ill health,"9 a general increase in the cost
of living,50 and other similar factors.51 "In assessing the recipient's need
for increased alimony, the court should not be limited to the bare ne-
cessities of life, but rather should consider the recipient's reasonable
needs in. relation to the obligor spouse's income, just as in the case
when alimony is initially being granted."52 Therefore, if the receiving
spouse is no longer able to maintain the lifestyle she has been accus-
tomed to on the present alimony received from the obligor spouse, then
an upward modification in her alimony should be awarded by the trial
court.
53
However, where the former wife's increased need is "due to a vol-
untary change in her way of life, the courts have been reluctant to
grant her an increase in alimony."" In situations where the recipient
spouse purposefully increased her standard of living, such as when the
alimony recipient obtains employment and becomes self supporting, she
should, at the very least, be required to provide that amount which is
above the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.5 5 This
situation was illustrated in Anderson v. Anderson where the former
husband filed a petition for modification of the divorce decree, seeking
to be relieved from the order requiring him to pay alimony on the
Maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2D 10, 59 (1951).
49. McArthur, 95 So. 2d at 524.
50. Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("[A]
rise in the cost of living is a change of circumstances which may be properly considered
by a trial judge in increasing the financial obligations of a husband . . . [where his]
ability to pay has also increased."); see Annotation, supra note 48, at 10. A.L.R.2D 10
(1951).
51. See, e.g., Howard, 118 So. 2d 90.
52. CLARK, supra note 1, at 661.
53. For example, in Wolfe v. Wolfe, the court stated that "[i]f the party seeking
a modification of alimony cannot 'go it alone,' if he or she is unable to 'be in a position
reasonably to continue to maintain the lifestyle to which the parties had become accus-
tomed during the marriage,' the petition for modification should be granted." 424 So.
2d 32, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
54. CLARK, supra note 1, at 661; see, e.g., Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
55. CLARK. supra note 1, at 661. Contra Punie v. Punie, 291 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the
former husband a reduction in his alimony obligation, because even though the finan-
cial circumstances of the former wife had improved, the husband's ability to pay had
improved even more substantially than the wife's.).
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ground that his former wife had become self supporting." The trial
court denied his petition, and the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed.5 7
The husband subsequently petitioned unsuccessfully to the Su-
preme Court of Florida for review."' Then, approximately ten years af-
ter filing his first petition for modification, the former husband filed a
second petition asking the court to reduce or terminate his alimony ob-
ligation.59 It is from Justice Roberts' dissent6" that the Third District
Court of Appeal, in reviewing the former husband's second petition for
modification, adopted the following language regarding the capability
of the wife for self support:
[T]he marriage status, once achieved by the wife, does not carry
with it the right forever after to be supported by her former hus-
band in veritable ease and comfort, regardless of her capabilities
for self support. The horse and buggy era when the husband's vow
to take care of his wife 'till death do us part' was accepted by both
parties as a sacred promise and an essential part of the marriage
contract-required, as well, by the mores of the society of that era
and the necessity of insuring that the divorced wife could not be-
come a public charge-is a thing of the past. 1
The order denying the former husband's second request for termination
of his obligation to pay alimony was reversed on the ground that the
former wife had become self supporting, even though he had a much
larger income.6 2
56. Anderson v. Anderson, 180 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
57. Id. at 363.
58. Anderson v. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1967) (dismissed for want of
conflict jurisdiction).
59. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
60. Even though Mr. Anderson's first petition was dismissed for want of conflict
jurisdiction, Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906 (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting).
61. Anderson, 333 So. 2d at 485 (quoting Anderson, 194 So. 2d at 908 (Roberts,
J., dissenting)).
62. Id. at 488. "Assuming, [however], that a reduction [or termination] of ali-
mony payments is proper where the [recipient] spouse has secured employment, the
court ordinarily will not reduce the payments in the exact amount of earnings, [be-
cause] that may take away an incentive to work." 24 AM. JUR 2D Divorce and Separa-
tion § 715, 707 (1983); see Annotation, supra note 48, at 63-7.
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B. Reduction in the Obligor Spouse's Income
A change in the financial condition of the obligor spouse, if sub-
stantial, often constitutes a change in circumstance so as to warrant a
modification of an alimony award. 3 Florida's modification statute pro-
vides that if "the financial ability of either party changes, . . . either
party may apply to the circuit court . . . for an order decreasing or
increasing the amount of . . . alimony.""' When an obligor spouses's
earnings are reduced to such a point that he is unable to comply with
the alimony payments, an order for a reduction or termination of ali-
mony obligations may be granted.65
However, an abatement of the obligor spouse's earnings must not
have been caused by his own willful actions. 6 "[T]he clean hands doc-
trine prevents a court of equity from relieving a former husband of his
obligation to pay alimony to his former wife where the decrease in the
former husband's financial ability to pay has been brought about by the
former husband's voluntary acts."'67 Thus, an obligor spouse who volun-
63. Note, supra note 24, at 75; see James R. Higgins, Jr., Modification of
Spousal Support: A Survey of a Confusing Area of the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 730
(1979); Annotation, supra note 48, at 16.
64. FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
65. See Rieder v. Rieder, 157 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
66. E.g., Waskin v. Waskin, 484 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (ex.husband's act of hiring someone to rid his ex-wife did not result in a change
of circumstance so as to modify the alimony award when he incurred great expenses in
defending the criminal charge against him); Coe v. Coe, 352 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1.977) (economic hardship due to increased spending by the obligor spouse is
not sufficient to relieve him from his alimony obligation); Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So.
2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (reduction of alimony was not granted to former
husband, a physician, who did not lack the requisite earning capacity, but allowed his
practice to close down to avoid his alimony obligation); see Note, supra note 24, at 76;
24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 712 (1983); M. L. Cross, Annotation, Hus-
bands Default, Contempt, or Other Misconduct as Affecting Modification of Decree
for Alimony, Separate Maintenance, or Support, 6 A.L.R.2D 835 (1949).
67. Waskin, 484 So. 2d at 1277. However, a problem arises when the obligor
spouse reaches an age where he voluntarily terminates himself from employment in
pursuit of permanent retirement from the workplace. The issue of whether the
postjudgment retirement of a spouse who is obligated to make alimony payments pur-
suant to a dissolution of marriage decree may be considered as a change of circum-
stance in which the alimony decree may be modified, has been a subject of conflict
among the Florida district courts of appeal. E.g., Pimm v. Pimm, 568 So. 2d 1299 (Fla.
2d Dist. C1. App. 1990); Ward v. Ward, 502 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
In Ward, the former husband, age 63, sought a reduction in his alimony obligation
since he had retired from his long-held job and his retirement necessarily resulted in a
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tarily reduces his income may be forced to continue the lifestyle that
existed at the time of the divorce in order to comply with his alimony
obligations.6 8 However, the obligor spouse should not be penalized if
he, in good faith, no longer wishes to maintain that lifestyle, and in-
stead wants to lead a less lucrative life which emphasizes personal val-
substantial decrease in his income. 502 So. 2d at 477. The Third District Court of
Appeal held that "while Ward was . . . entitled to retire from his more than forty
years of steady employment, he was not entitled to have his former wife defray the cost
of his retirement through a reduction of his long-standing obligations to her." Id. at
478. The court noted that at the time of Ward's voluntary retirement, he was fully
capable of working. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the obligor spouse may have
the amount of his obligation reduced only when the inability to pay is affected by
circumstances beyond the obligor spouse's control-such as ill-health or where the de-
cision to retire was mandated by his employer. Id.
In Pimm v. Pimm, the court refused to follow the ruling in Ward that, as a matter
of law, an obligor spouse "cannot rely on the reduced income at retirement as a change
in circumstances that may be considered on a petition for modification of alimony."
Pimm, 568 So. 2d at 1300. Instead, the court held that an obligor spouse's voluntary
retirement is a factor to be considered in determining whether the obligor spouse is
entitled to a downward modification of his alimony obligation. Id. at 1301. The court
reasoned that even if the parties had remained married, the 65 year old husband more
than likely would have retired, as often people do, and they would have been expected
to live on a reduced income. Id. at 1300. In criticizing the holding in Ward, the court
stated that to follow the Ward decision would "place many supporting spouses in the
position of being unable to retire at any age so long as their alimony obligations re-
mained unchanged." Id.
In acknowledging the conflict between the Ward decision and the Pimm decision,
and in finding the affects of a spouse's voluntary retirement a subject of great public
importance in the state of Florida, the Pimm court certified the following question to
the Florida Supreme Court:
IS THE POSTJUDGMENT RETIREMENT OF A SPOUSE WHO IS
OBLIGATED TO MAKE SUPPORT OR ALIMONY PAYMENTS
PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION OF MAR-
RIAGE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAY BE CON-
SIDERED TOGETHER WITH OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS AND
APPLICABLE LAW UPON A PETITION TO MODIFY SUCH ALI-
MONY OR SUPPORT PAYMENTS?
Id. at 1301.
Oral arguments concerning this issue were heard by the Florida Supreme Court on
September 5, 1991. Its decision is now pending. See Pimm v. Pimm, No. 76,885 (Fla.
Oct. 12, 1991).
68. Note, supra note 24, at 76; see also David A. Giacalone, The Drop Out Ex-
Husband's Right to Reduce Alimony and Support Payments, 1 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
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ues over material ones.6 9 Therefore, a self-induced decline in the obli-
gor spouse's income should, only upon a substantial showing of good
faith or cause therefor, constitute a change in circumstance so as to
provide a basis for modifying the alimony award.
C. Increase in Obligor Spouse's Income Without Increase in
Recipient Spouse's Need
Although a downward modification of alimony may be awarded if
the obligor spouse's financial condition worsens, does it follow that ali-
mony should be increased if the obligor spouse should suddenly pros-
per?7 0 The answer to this question should be no. However, Florida's
modification statute71 reads in pertinent part:
When the parties enter into an agreement for payments for . . .
alimony, . . . or when a party is required by court order to make
any payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of ei-
ther party changes,. . . either party may apply to the circuit court
. . . for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of. . . ali-
mony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity re-
quires .... 72
It appears from the modification statute's plain language that an
increase in the financial ability of the obligor spouse is sufficient
enough to support a modification of alimony in Florida.7 3 Recently,
however, Florida courts have continued to disagree on this issue when
interpreting the meaning of the modification statute.
1. Florida Supreme Court
In McArthur v. McArthur, the Florida Supreme Court suggested
69. Id.
70. CLARK, supra note 1, at 662. This was the question posed before the Florida
Supreme Court in Bedell. See 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
71. FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See id. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is silent on the issue of
whether a modification can be granted based on a showing of a change in the financial
ability of either party. Section 316(a) provides "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . .
any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified . . . only upon a show-
ing of changed circumstances .... " UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §
316(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
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that an increase in the former husband's financial condition may, by
itself, warrant an upward modification in alimony payments to his for-
mer wife. 74 The former wife filed a petition for an increase in alimony
alleging, among other things, that the former husband's income had
greatly increased 5.7 Even though the former wife sought an increase in
alimony based upon a change in circumstance of both parties, the su-
preme court expressly stated that the former wife could "have filed a
petition for an increase in alimony on the basis of the change in [the
former husband's] financial condition ....
The supreme court, however, in ultimately deciding this case,
found that there had been a change of circumstance as to both par-
ties.77 This case, therefore, represents the traditionally accepted situa-
tion of a "changed circumstance. '78
2. Second District Court of Appeal
The second district's position on the issue of whether an increase
in the obligor spouse's financial ability is, by itself, sufficient enough to
warrant an upward modification in the alimony decree is well illus-
trated by Terry v. Terry79 and Lenton v. Lenton.8 °
In Terry, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that there
had been a sufficient change in the former husband's financial condition
so as to warrant an increase in the former wife's alimony.81 The court
74. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957).
75. Id. at 522. The statutory basis for the former wife's petition for modification
of alimony was FLA. STAT. § 61.15 (1955), the predecessor to Florida's current modifi-
cation statute, FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1989). Section 61.15 contained essentially the same
language as the current modification statute.
76. McArthur, 95 So. 2d at 524.
77. See id. The Florida Supreme Court stated:
It seems to us that the changes in circumstances in the financial condition
of Mr. McArthur and Mrs. McArthur's condition of health and inability
to work in themselves constitute sufficient cause to justify an increase in
the amount of alimony which she should receive. The further change in
Mr. McArthur's financial condition . . . might perhaps justify even a
greater increase in the sums which she should receive.
Id.
78. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 660; Annotation, supra note 48, at 59.
79. Terry v. Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 133
So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1961).
80. Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review de-
nied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980).
81. Terry, 126 So. 2d at 892.
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further noted that the increase in the former husband's financial condi-
tion "must necessarily [have been] contemplated by the language of
[the modification statute]. '"8" However, it is apparent from the facts in
Terry that the former wife's needs had increased since the final divorce
decree. 83 The parties incorporated into their final divorce decree an
agreement made between them whereby the former husband would pay
his former wife $375.00 per month in alimony. Subsequent to their
agreement, the former husband's salary had increased from $600.00 to
$1,000.00 per month and he was also deriving other income from vari-
ous investments. The former wife stated in her petition for modification
that her needs had increased, and that her existing alimony award was
inadequate to meet those needs.84 As in McArthur,8" it is clear that the
change in the former husband's financial ability to pay did justify an
upward modification in the alimony payments because the former wife
also expressed a corresponding need for the additional funds.
However, in Lenton, the former wife petitioned for modification of
her alimony because of a "dramatic improvement in her former hus-
band's financial condition."8 The trial court denied the former wife's
request for an upward modification, based on the fact that her financial
needs had not changed since the dissolution of marriage.87 In reversing
the trial court's decision, the Second District Court of Appeal stated
that "[a] change in circumstances of only one of the parties is sufficient
to justify a modification of alimony." 88
Nevertheless, the facts in Lenton clearly show that the former
wife's needs were not initially met by the original divorce decree, be-
cause the husband had submitted an inaccurate financial affidavit upon
which the; award of alimony was based. 89 The former wife accepted a
82. Id.; see also McArthur, 95 So. 2d at 524.
83. Terry, 126 So. 2d at 891.
84. Id.
85. McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957).
86. Lenton, 370 So. 2d at 31.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 282 So.
2d 877 (Fla. 1973); see also Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (alimony decree can be modified based on a change of the former wife's circum-
stances without a corresponding change in the former husband's financial ability).
89. At. the time of the divorce, the former wife needed $1,650 per month from
the former husband to maintain the standard of living the parties enjoyed during their
marriage. Lenton, 370 So. 2d at 31. In reliance on the former husband's inaccurate
financial affidavit, the former wife agreed to accept $500 per month for alimony. Id.
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decrease in her standard of living, because her former husband appar-
ently did not have the financial means to maintain her in the lifestyle
that she had been accustomed to during the marriage. 90 The Second
District Court of Appeal stated that a recipient spouse should not be
held to an agreement where the obligor spouse's financial limitations
were not accurate. 91 Because the needs of the former wife were not
initially met by the original divorce decree, and had continued to be
unmet at the time of her request for modification, the upward modifica-
tion based on an increase in the former husband's ability to pay was
justified.
3. Fourth District Court of Appeal
The leading case in the fourth district on the issue of whether a
substantial increase in the former husband's financial condition can,
standing alone, warrant a modification of the alimony decree, is Eng-
land v. England.2 In denying the former wife's request for an increase
in permanent periodic alimony, the trial court found that the former
husband had the ability to pay additional support, but concluded that
there was no showing of a substantial change of circumstance on the
wife's part so as to warrant a modification.98
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in reversing the
lower court's decision, stated that "to succeed in a motion to increase
an alimony award, it is only necessary for a petitioner to prove either
an increase in need or the ability to pay."194 From this, it would appear
that a court does not have to look at the needs of the recipient spouse
when determining whether to grant an upward modification. An in-
crease in the ability of the obligor spouse to pay would be enough of a
showing to warrant a modification. However, the court contradicted its
earlier statement by stating "[o]f course, alimony should not be in-
creased absent a demonstration of need for increased support and the
other spouse's ability to respond to that need." 95
In the court's view, there was no question that the facts reflected
both, a substantial increase in the former wife's need for alimony and a
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
93. Id. at 701.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 700.
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substantial increase in the former husband's ability to pay alimony.9 6
Therefore, the court ultimately decided this case based on the change
of circumstance as to both parties. 97 Under these facts, the upward
modification was proper.
4. Third District Court of Appeal
In interpreting Florida's modification statute,9 8 case law in the
third district has been erratic. 99 The inconsistent laws in this district
are well illustrated by three cases.
In Sherman v. Sherman, the question presented to the court was
whether "[permanent] periodic alimony can be increased upon a peti-
tion for modification when the only change of circumstance shown was
a substantial increase in the earnings of the former husband."100 Upon
the authority of Florida's modification statute,"0' the Third District
Court of Appeal held that the question presented must be answered in
the affirmative.' However, a strong dissenting opinion written by
Chief Judge Barkdull stated in part:
I have strong convictions that the former wife in the instant matter
is not entitled to a raise in alimony . . . . [Pleriodic alimony ....
is to be awarded for the purpose of permitting the former wife to
live in the manner and custom established by the husband. [Here,
the original alimony award] was commensurate with the scale of
living maintained by the [former husband] during the time the par-
ties were man and wife . . . .Following the majority's opinion to a
logical conclusion, a former wife receiving periodic alimony could
hold her former husband to an increase in alimony upon increased
earnings at any time during the remainder of his life. I do not think
the courts should condone such action.1
0 3
As will become evident, Judge Barkdull's dissent was to followed by
96. Id. at 701.
97. See England, 520 So. 2d at 701.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
99. See Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973). But see Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
100. Sherman, 279 So. 2d at 888.
101. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(l) (1989).
102. Sherman, 279 So. 2d at 888.
103. Id. at 889 (Barkdull, C.J., dissenting).
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other court decisions involving this issue.
Seven years later, in Powell v. Powell, the third district receded
from its prior decision in Sherman.'0' The court noted in a footnote
"[o]f course, an increase in the husband's ability would not itself jus-
tify an upward modification of alimony if the wife's needs are already
fully met either by the existing award or otherwise."10 5 However, the
court's award of an upward modification of alimony rested on the find-
ing that there had been a material increase in the former wife's
needs. '6 Furthermore, the former husband stipulated that his ability to
pay had materially changed for the better.10 7 Therefore, this case sug-
gests that before an upward modification in alimony can be granted,
the recipient spouse must demonstrate that either her needs were ini-
tially unmet by the original divorce decree and continue to be unmet,
or that a substantial change in her needs has taken place since the
original award.' 8
Likewise, the third district's decision in Frantz v. Frantz'0 9 repre-
sents a continued shift away from the Sherman"0 decision. In Frantz,
the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the former wife an
increase in alimony."' The court essentially adopted the footnote in
Powell,"2 by holding that "an increase in the husband's ability to pay
would not itself justify an upward modification of alimony if the former
wife's needs are already fully met . . . by the existing award.""' Sev-
eral of the Florida cases analyzed in this comment state that an up-
ward modification in alimony can be granted if there is a substantial
change in the financial ability of only one party; namely an increase in
the obligor spouse's ability to pay."" However, these courts justified
104. Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
105. Id. at 1216 n.6.
106. Id. at 1215.
107. Id. at 1216 n.4.
108. See Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214.
109. Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) review denied,
459 So. 2d 1040 (1984).
110. Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) review de-
nied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973).
111. Id. at 430.
112. See supra text accompanying note 105.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957); England v.
England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d
30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); Sherman
v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 282 So. 2d 877
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their decisions to grant modification on the basis of the recipient
spouse's demonstrated need for the increased funds." 5
The question, therefore, is still open as to whether a recipient
spouse can request and receive an upward modification in her alimony
based solely on the obligor spouse's increase in his financial ability to
pay. On May 30, 1991, with the decision in Bedell v. Bedell," 6 the
Supreme Court of Florida directly confronted this issue.
IV. BEDELL v. BEDELL
A. Facts
In 1962, Diane Bedell and Robert Bedell were married. During
the parties' eleven year marriage, Mrs. Bedell did not work outside the
home, while Mr. Bedell attended medical school and subsequently ob-
tained a medical degree. The marriage was dissolved in July, 1975, and
at that time Mr. Bedell had just opened his first medical office. Under
the terms of the final judgment, which incorporated a settlement agree-
ment, Mrs. Bedell received $415 per month in permanent alimony.117
Thereafter, on July 12, 1986, Mrs. Bedell filed a petition for modifica-
tion in the trial court, seeking an increase in her alimony.
B. The Lower Courts
After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered an order denying
Mrs. Bedell's request for an upward modification in her alimony." 8
Mrs. Bedell's primary contention for seeking an increase in her alimony
(Fla. 1973); Terry v. Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
133 So. 2d 321 (1961).
115. See McArthur v. McArthur, 95 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1957); England v. Eng-
land, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); Terry
v.Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 133 So. 2d 321 (Fla.
1961). But see Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 28.2 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973).
116. Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
117. Furthermore, Mrs. Bedell received $250 per month in child support for each
of her two children. Id. at 1006. In 1977, Mrs. Bedell relinquished custody of the two
children to the husband and at that time, Mr. Bedell ceased making the child support
payments to Mrs. Bedell. Id.
118. Bedell v. Bedell, 561 So. 2d 1197, 1181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), juris.
accepted, 569 So. 2d 444 (1990).
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was that the cost of living had increased since the time that she and
Mr. Bedell were divorced.119 The trial court found that Mrs. Bedell
"failed to demonstrate that she had been detrimentally effected by the
rise in the cost of living or that such a rise has caused an increase in
her need." 120 Mrs. Bedell appealed to the Third District Court of
Appeal.' 21
The third district considered Mrs. Bedell's appeal en banc because
of the conflict of decisions within the district,122 Mrs. Bedell argued
that she was entitled to an increase in alimony as a matter of law under
Florida's modification statute, and that this entitlement was based
solely on the husband's stipulated substantial upward shift of his finan-
cial capacity since the final judgment. 2
The court admitted that the "[modification] statute authorizes a
recipient spouse to apply for an increase in alimony when the financial
ability of the obligor spouse changes for the better.' 24 However, the
court noted that it was "not required by the statute to grant such a
motion.' 25 The court reasoned that the recipient spouse's needs are the
controlling factor in determining an alimony modification, and to hold
otherwise would grant that spouse a continued interest in the former
spouse's good fortune. 1 The court recognized that the exception to the
119. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5-6, Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla.
1991) (No. 75894) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
120. Initial Brief of Petitioner at 2, Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991)
(No. 75894) [hereinafter Initial Brief].
121. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1181.
122. Id. at 1180; see Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 459 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1984); Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 282 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1973).
123. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1181; see FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989) The Third
District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida analyzed Bedell under
FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1985). However, FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1989) contains essentially
the same language. Therefore, the 1989 version of Florida's modification statute will be
the one cited to by the author.
124. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1181.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1182 (citing Irwin v. Irwin, 539 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989)). The court stated:
[W]here the financial needs of the recipient spouse, as established by the
standard of living maintained during the marriage, have not substantially
increased since the final judgment, the trial court is justified in denying a
motion to modify upward the alimony award, even though there has been a
substantial increase in the financial circumstances of the paying spouse.
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rule that the recipient spouse must demonstrate an increased need
before a request for an upward modification can be considered is,
the rare case where the recipient spouse's needs, as established by
the standard of living maintained during the marriage, were not,
and could not be initially met by the original divorce decree due to
the then existing financial inability of the paying spouse to meet
those needs, which needs continue to remain unmet at the time the
modification is sought. 127
In affirming the trial court's decision, the district court acknowledged
that its decision stood in conflict with the decision in Sherman,28 but
in support of Judge Barkdull's dissenting opinion in that case. 129 There-
after, the Supreme Court of Florida decided to review the case. 30
C. Supreme Court of Florida
On appeal, Mrs. Bedell argued that the Third District Court of
Appeal's restrictive interpretation of the modification statute was di-
rectly contrary to the express language contained in the statute.' 3 ' In
opposition, Mr. Bedell argued that if a modification can be granted as
a matter of law, based on a change in the financial ability of either
party, namely the obligor spouse, without considering equity principles,
then there would no longer be any such thing as a divorce. 132 Instead,
former spouses would continue to be required to share their increased
income with their ex-spouses, without limitation, for all time.'
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging
Id.
127. Bedell, 561 So. 2d at 1182.
128. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887.
129. Bedell, at 1183; see supra text accompanying note 103.
130. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted Bedell for
review because the decision rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal in that case
directly conflicted with the language stated in England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) and Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980). Id.
131. Initial Brief, supra note 120, at 16. In determining the legislative intent of a
statute, the general rule is, "when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous,
judicial interpretation is not appropriate ...... Citizens of Fla. v. Public Serv.
Comm., 435 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 1983).
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that alimony modification may be granted when the circumstances or
the financial ability of either party changes.134 The court observed the
line of Florida cases that represented the proposition that the recipient
spouse's need, as established by the standard of living during the mar-
riage, should be the first determination made, and only then, if a sub-
stantial need had been shown, could the obligor spouse's ability to pay
be considered.' 35 The court then noted that "at least two courts have
held that in order to succeed with a motion to increase an alimony
award, it is only necessary for a petitioner to prove either an increase in
need or an increase in the ability to pay."' 36 In interpreting the preced-
ing two lines of authority in light of the modification statute's intent,' 37
the court stated that they were not irreconcilable, and that the solution
lied between the two positions. 38
In analyzing the legislature's intent, the supreme court stated that
the "[modification] statute gives an ex-spouse an [unconditional] right
to file a petition for an increase in alimony where the circumstances or
the financial ability of either party has changed."'' 39 However, the court
construed the statute's provision for equitable jurisdiction to mean that
a court is not required to grant an increase in alimony simply upon a
showing of a substantial increase in the financial ability of the obligor
spouse, because equity dictates whether such a modification should be
ordered." O Thus, "a substantial increase in the financial ability of the
paying spouse, standing alone, may justify but does not require an or-
der of increased alimony.' '14
By using the language "may justify" in their holding, the supreme
court equivocated on this issue. The supreme court further stated that
it "would expect that a raise in alimony would be ordered when no
134. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007 (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1985)).
135. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007; see, e.g., Irwin v. Irwin, 539 So. 2d 1177 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Bess v. Bess, 471 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 476 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985), review denied, 482 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1986);
Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 459 So. 2d
1040 (Fla. 1984); Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
136. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007; see England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lenton v. Lenton, 370 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), review denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989).
138. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007.
139. Id.
140. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (1989) which provides that in a proceeding
for modification "the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires ... .
141. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1007.
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increased need was shown only in extraordinary cases where the equita-
ble considerations were particularly compelling.' 4 However, the court
failed to state the type of extraordinary cases that would be "particu-
larly compelling" enough to warrant an increase in alimony when no
concomitant increased need was shown.
Finally, the court concluded that based on these facts, the wife
was entitled to an increase in her alimony because she "clearly demon-
strated an increased need.""" In so holding, the court accepted Mrs.
Bedell's testimony that the original alimony award was sufficient only
because she was receiving $500 per month for child support in addition
to alimony."' In addition, the court also accepted her argument that
because the cost of living had gone up since the divorce, her standard
of living had gone down and she was not living in the manner she was
accustomed to during the marriage. 1 5 Therefore, a substantial increase
in Mrs. Bedell's needs coupled with Mr. Bedell's ability to pay justified
an upward modification of alimony." 6
V. CONCLUSION
In rendering its decision in Bedell, the Supreme Court of Florida
evaded the application of its own precedent on the issue of whether an
upward modification in alimony could be granted based on the sole fact
that the obligor spouse had an increased ability to pay. The court did
not base its decision upon the stipulated finding that the obligor spouse
had a substantial increase in his income. To the contrary, in ultimately
deciding on whether to grant an upward modification, the court found
that a need was demonstrated by the recipient spouse. 11
This decision sends a confusing message to the lower Florida
courts. A clear precedent has not been set because the Florida Supreme
Court did not take a firm stand on the very issue that brought Bedell to
the supreme court. Therefore, the inconsistency among the decisions
rendered from the various district courts in Florida will most likely
continue. It is conceivable that an obligor spouse may be required to
pay an additional sum to a spouse who has not demonstrated a substan-
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1008.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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tial need solely based on his increase in income. Perhaps Pimm v.
Pimm, which is now pending before the Florida Supreme Court, will
decide this issue.14 8
Helene R. Cohen
148. See Pimm v. Pimm, No. 76, 885 (Fla. Oct. 12, 1990). The issue before the
supreme court in Pimm is factually converse to Bedell. Compare with Pimm v. Pimm,
568 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Pimm involves whether an obligor
spouse who retires and, therefore, no longer has an income can reduce or terminate his
alimony obligation based on that fact alone, and without a corresponding showing that
the recipient spouse's need has decreased, see also supra discussion at note 67.
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